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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' use of their
property is a valid "nonconforming use" that cannot be prohibited by a subsequent
change in the zoning law.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Town of Aha v. Ben Hame Corp,, 836 P.2d
797, 800 (Utah App. 1992).
Preservation of Issue: The issue was raised and decided in favor of plaintiffs. (R.
125-36, 254-55; Transcript of Trial, hereafter "Tr.,v at 167-77, 183-85.)
2. Whether the district court correctly concluded that, as an alternative basis for
relief to plaintiffs, zoning estoppel precludes the City from enforcing its new zoning
ordinance against plaintiffs.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., supra, at
800, 802-03.
Preservation of Issue: The issue was raised and decided in favor of plaintiffs. (R.
125, 132, 252-54; Tr. 176-77.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and ordinances are determinative of the issues presented
and are set forth verbatim in the Addendum: U.C.A. §§ 10-9-103(l)(k) and -408(l)(a);
Woods Cross Zoning Ordinance § 11-13-1(A) and 11-22-1. (Add. 35-45.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff trucking company to enjoin the city's
enforcement of a new zoning ordinance that prevents parking of trucks and trailers on
plaintiffs property. The district court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on
the basis of material fact disputes. Following a bench trial, the district court entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding that
plaintiffs' use of their property is a valid non-conforming use that may continue under
the new zoning law and, alternatively, that zoning estoppel precludes the city from
enforcing its new zoning law to prevent plaintiffs' historical use of their property. (R.
246, Add. 19.) The city appeals from that judgment. (R. 258.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Original Ownership and Use of the Property
Plaintiffs, Damon and Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc. (collectively
"Hugoes"), own 3.5 acres of land (hereafter "the Property") located at approximately
1200 West and 500 South in Woods Cross City ("the City"). The Property and an
"Adjacent Parcel" were originally owned as a single tract of land by Frank Branch, who
acquired the land to construct a semi-truck maintenance shop. The entire tract was under
the jurisdiction of Davis County ("the County") prior to annexation by the City in 1988.
(Findings of Fact 1-4; Tr. 4-5,47; PL Exh. 1, Add. 32.)
In approximately 1985, Mr. Branch leased the Property to Clarence Newman and
sold the Adjacent Parcel to Richard Fleming. Up until the time the Property was sold to
2

Hugoes in 1991, Mr. Newman used the Property for parking his large trucks and semitrailers that he used in his insulation business. No one from the County ever objected to
Mr. Newman's use of the Property or gave any indication that his use was unlawful or
required a permit. From 1985 to the present, Mr. Fleming has used the Adjacent Parcel
for parking and storage of his construction equipment and vehicles, including semitrucks and trailers, dump trucks, and loaders. In 1985, Mr. Fleming obtained a permit
from the County to install a culvert that was used for access to both parcels. The County
also authorized and assisted in hauling fill material onto both parcels. The County knew
how the two properties were being used and never objected to that use or gave any
indication that the use was unlawful or required a permit. Because 500 South is a major
east-west thoroughfare, the use of these two adjacent parcels was open, obvious, and
observable. (Findings of Fact 1, 5-8; Tr. 5-6, 13-15, 17-20, 22-30, 34, 38-39, 42-43; PL
Exh. 1.)
Annexation and Continued Use of the Property
In 1988, Mr. Branch and Mr. Fleming were contacted by Ralph Argyle, Mayor of
Woods Cross City, to enlist their support in the proposed City annexation of land that
included their adjacent properties. Branch and Fleming both asked Mayor Argyle
whether annexation would change or preclude the use of their properties for parking and
maintenance of semi-trucks, trailers, and related vehicles. The mayor responded that the
City had no objection to their current use of the properties and that annexation would not
change or limit that use. The mayor repeated this assurance on several subsequent
3

occasions prior to annexation. Debbie Hugoe was present at some of these meetings and
heard the mayor's assurances regarding continued use of the properties. The mayor
never questioned the use of the properties for parking of trucks and trailers and never
stated that a permit would be required for that use. In reliance on the mayor's assurances,
both Branch and Fleming supported annexation. The annexation was formally approved
on December 6, 1988. (Findings of Fact 9; Tr. 7-12, 34-39, 66-67; PL Exhs. 7-8.)
Upon annexation by the City, the adjacent Branch and Fleming properties were
included in Commercial Zone C-2. Following annexation, Mr. Newman (as Branch's
lessee) and Mr. Fleming continued to use the properties as before, for parking and
storage of trucks, trailers, and related equipment. No one from the City ever objected to
their use of the properties, nor ever notified them that their use was illegal under the C-2
zoning or required any approval or permit from the City. In fact, Tim Stephens, the
City's Community Development Director, responsible for administration of planning and
zoning matters, testified that uses permitted by the County did not require site plan
approval upon annexation into the City. Moreover, no one from the City ever questioned
whether the use of annexed properties had been approved by the County, and Mr.
Stephens did not know whether the use of these properties had been approved by the
County. (Findings of Fact 6-8; Tr. 14-16, 19-21, 38-39, 43,106-08,122,133-34, 143,
163-66; PL Exh. 7.)

4

Plaintiffs' Purchase and Use of the Property
Damon and Debbie Hugoe own Hugoe Trucking, Inc., which engages in interstate
transport of various commodities, as well as local hauling of sand and gravel products.
They have been in business since 1979. They currently employ up to fifty people and
operate over twenty trucks and trailers of various kinds and sizes. (Tr. 45-49, 53-55; PI.
Exh. 4.)
In May of 1991, Hugoes were looking for a parcel of land that they could use as a
staging ground to park their trucks and trailers between trips. They were referred to
Frank Branch, who offered the 3.5-acre parcel he had been leasing to Clarence Newman.
This Branch parcel ("the Property") seemed ideal for the Hugoes' purposes because it
had been used for parking of trucks and trailers by Mr. Newman, the Adjacent Parcel had
also been used for the same purpose by Richard Fleming, and the Property was located
near to the Hugoes' office and home, in close proximity to gravel pits and freeway
access. (Finding of Fact 10; Tr. 46-49, 52-53, 58, 80-81.)
Before purchasing the Property, Debbie Hugoe went to the City offices to verify
the zoning and permitted uses to ensure there would be no restriction on any part of their
business. She met with Tim Stephens and told him that she owned Hugoe Trucking, that
she was interested in purchasing the Branch property for the purpose of parking trucks
and trailers, and that she wanted to verify that current zoning permitted the proposed use.
Mr. Stephens responded that the Property was zoned C-2 and gave Mrs. Hugoe a copy of
the C-2 zoning ordinance. Mrs. Hugoe then read through the permitted uses, with Mr.
5

Stephens looking on, and checked the uses that might pertain to her business, including
transfer company, repair garage, tire shop, and accessory uses and buildings incidental to
those uses. Mr. Stephens made no statement or indication that Hugoes9 proposed use
was not permitted by the zoning, or that such use required a permit or approval from the
City, or that any zoning change was planned. Based on the prior and current uses of the
Property and Adjacent Parcel, the apparent inclusion of such uses in the C-2 zoning
ordinance, and the absence of any objection or further requirement from the City, Hugoes
purchased the Property in June 1991 for $75,000. (Findings of Fact 10-13; Tr. 47, 4953, 56-59, 92-93, 109-10, 151; PL Exhs. 2, 5, Add. 35.)
Following purchase of the Property, Hugoes began parking their trucks and
trailers on the Property. To improve the Property for this use, Hugoes began hauling in
fill material and gravel to level the surface and eliminate low spots that accumulated
moisture. Some of this fill material included ground asphalt removed from City streets
under a street-repair contract with Staker Paving. Scott Anderson, City Public Works
Director, came to the Property, observed the use of the Property and the placement of fill,
and notified Hugoes that a fill permit was required. That same day, August 12, 1991,
Debbie Hugoe went to the City offices and met with Tim Stephens to apply for a fill
permit. Mr. Stephens provided a form, titled "Building Permit Application," and marked
with an "x" the lines that Mrs. Hugoe was to complete, basically identifying information.
Mr. Stephens then filled in the property number, the type of improvement as "Fill," the
C-2 zoning designation, the zoning approval, and the fee. They discussed the purpose of
6

the fill, the type of fill material, and the use of the Property. Mrs. Hugoe asked if their
use of the Property was "totally legal," and Mr. Stephens said, "Yes." Mr. Stephens gave
no indication that any further permit or site plan approval was required, and he made no
mention of any proposed zoning change. He issued the fill permit two days later, again
with no restriction or requirement of any further approval or permit. With the permit,
Hugoes completed their improvement of the Property, applying roughly three feet of fill
material over the entire Property, thirty-to-forty thousand tons, at a cost of over
$200,000. (Findings of Fact 13-19; Tr. 41-42, 59-65, 68-71, 87, 94, 110-14, 135-41,
153-54; PL Exh. 3, Add. 33.)
From their purchase of the Property in June 1991 until March 1992, the Hugoes
used the Property for parking their trucks and trailers with no objection or notice from
the City that such use was not permitted, that site plan approval was required, or that a
zoning change was proposed or had occurred. (Finding of Fact 20; Tr. 71-72, 75, 15556.)
Zoning Change and City Objections
On March 27, 1992, Tim Stephens sent a letter to the Hugoes notifying them that
the zoning of their Property had been changed to I-l Light Industrial, that the new zoning
did not permit parking and open storage of trucks and large equipment, and that they
must "cease and desist" such use of the Property without a site plan approval. (PL Exhs.
6, 9; Def. Exh. 2.) This was the Hugoes' first notice of the zoning change and of any
objection to their use of the Property. Mrs. Hugoe immediately called Mr. Stephens and
7

inquired whether they should request site plan approval, and he responded that such a
request would do no good because it would be denied. He said that trucks could be
parked on the Property only in a large garage. Because covered parking for all their
trucks and trailers was not feasible, and Hugoes could find no other similar and
affordable property for their purposes, Hugoes continued to use the Property for parking
their trucks and trailers. The City sent subsequent notices to the Hugoes ordering them to
remove their trucks, trailers and related equipment from the Property, and threatening
prosecution if they did not comply. Having no alternative, other than going out of
business, Hugoes have continued using the Property to park their trucks and trailers.
(Findings of Fact 21-22; Tr. 72, 74-77, 81-83, 114-16, 142-45; Def. Exhs. 4-6.)
In August 1995, the City served a criminal information on the Hugoes, charging
them with violating the new 1-1 Industrial/Business Park zoning by using their Property
for open storage of trucks, trailers, and related equipment. (R. 57.) Hugoes responded
by commencing this action to enjoin enforcement of the new zoning law to prevent the
historical use of their Property. (R. 1.) The district court denied the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment, finding material issues of fact. (R. 220-23, Add. 30.)
Following a bench trial, the court entered a lengthy and detailed Trial Ruling, setting
forth findings of fact and concluding that (1) Hugoes9 use of the Property is a valid
nonconforming use that may continue under the new zoning law; and (2) the elements of
zoning estoppel are satisfied to prevent the City from enforcing its new zoning law
against Hugoes. (R. 228, Add. 1.) The court incorporated that ruling in its Findings of
8

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R. 246, Add. 19.) The City appeals from that
final judgment. (R. 258.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The judgment in this case is based on the findings and conclusions of the district
court, as entered by the court following a bench trial. The findings in support of the
conclusions and judgment cannot be set aside unless shown to be clearly erroneous. The
City has failed to meet that burden. Therefore, the conclusions and judgment, as
otherwise supported by the law, must be affirmed.
Hugoes' use of their Property to park trucks and trailers is a vested
nonconforming use because it validly existed prior to the 1992 zoning change that
outlaws such use. Hugoes' predecessor used the Property for the same purpose prior to
annexation in 1988, and up to the purchase by Hugoes in 1991. Prior to purchase,
Hugoes obtained assurances from the City zoning administrator that their use was
permitted under the current C-2 zoning. Hugoe Trucking is a permitted "transfer
company" within the meaning of the zoning ordinance. The zoning administrator again
assured Hugoes that their use was "legal" when he issued a fill permit, allowing Hugoes
to improve the Property for the planned use. The zoning administrator never told
Hugoes that their use was not permitted, or that they were required to obtain a site plan
approval. In fact, no site plan was required because Hugoes were merely continuing the
same use as their predecessor. Hugoes acquired a vested right to continue using their
Property to park trucks and trailers.
9

Alternatively, Hugoes have vested rights under the doctrine of zoning estoppel
because they incurred substantial expense for improvements to the Property in reliance
on the zoning administrator's assurances that their use was legal, on his issuance of the
fill permit for the purpose of facilitating that use, and on his failure to notify them that
their use was improper or required site plan approval. In response to Mrs. Hugoe's
specific inquiries regarding the permissibility of their use, the zoning administrator had a
duty to inform her of any supposed problem or further requirement. The City's power of
zoning enforcement is limited by principles of equity when the City has allowed vested
rights to intervene, and no vital public interest is at stake. Finally, the district court
properly relied on zoning estoppel in its judgment, even though the theory was not
mentioned by name in the complaint, because the evidence related to estoppel is the same
as for the vested rights theory, and the evidence was admitted without objection from the
City.
ARGUMENT
The purpose of zoning laws is to promote the health, safety, prosperity, and
general welfare of the community by, among other things, minimizing potential conflicts
between incompatible uses of property in the same area. See, e.g., Patterson v. Utah
County Bd of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1995); U.C.A. § 10-9-102.
However, "because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's commonlaw right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property
uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be
10

liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Patterson, supra, at 606 n.10 (where
doubt exists, zoning ordinance must be interpreted in favor of the property owner).
Courts are free to enjoin or set aside zoning provisions or actions that are confiscatory,
arbitrary, unreasonable, contrary to statute, or that do not further their declared purpose.
See, e.g., Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559, 562 (Utah 1967);
Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1982); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d
704, 708-09 (Utah 1943); Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1964).
POINT I:

A.

HUGOES' USE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO PARK TRUCKS AND
TRAILERS IS A VALID NONCONFORMING USE THAT MAY
CONTINUE UNDER THE NEW ZONING LAW.

Law of Nonconforming Use
Zoning laws, by their own terms and as enforced by the courts, generally have no

retroactive application to deprive a property owner of a valid existing use. Under this
doctrine of "nonconforming use," a use of property that lawfully existed prior to a
change in the zoning law is considered a vested property right and may be maintained
under the new law even though that use does not conform to the new law. 4 Ziegler,
Rathkopf s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 51.01[l]-[2] (4 th ed. 1998). This
protected status accorded lawful existing nonconforming uses may be based on
constitutional interpretation, specific statutory or ordinance provisions, or equitable
estoppel. A zoning provision that deprives a property owner of an existing lawful use is
considered confiscatory and an unconstitutional taking of the property without
compensation and due process. Statutory and ordinance provisions protecting
11

nonconforming uses are intended to avoid unconstitutional application of the zoning
laws. Id. § 51.01[2][a]-[c]. The vested right to a nonconforming use runs with the land
and is, therefore, not affected by annexation or changes in ownership. Id. §§ 51.02[h]
and51.03[l].
Utah zoning law has long protected nonconforming uses. The original
nonconforming use statute, passed in 1925 and codified as section 10-9-6, U.C.A.
(1986), provided that zoning powers "shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner of
any property of its use for the purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted." (Add. 46.)
Current law, U.C.A. § 10-9-408 of the Municipal Land Use Development and
Management Act, states:
(l)(a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or
structure may be continued.

(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or
amendment for:
(a) the establishment... of nonconforming uses upon the
terms and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance. [Add. 42.]
Section 10-9-103(l)(k) defines a nonconforming use:
"Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning
regulation governing the land changed; and

12

(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with
the zoning regulations that now govern the land. [Add. 44.]
The Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance also specifically protects
nonconforming uses. Section 11-22-1 states:
Any lawful use of buildings or land at the time of the passage of this
Ordinance, which does not conform to the regulations prescribed in this
Ordinance, shall be deemed a non-conforming use and such use may be
continued . . . . [Def. Exh. 7, Add. 40.]
Ordinance section 11-2-1 defines "nonconforming use" as "[t]he use of any building or
premises contrary to the use regulations of this Ordinance for the zone in which the
building or premises is located." (Def. Exh. 7.)
B.

Application to Present Case
Under the foregoing statutes and ordinances, Hugoes' use of the Property to park

their trucks and trailers is a vested nonconforming use. In compliance with statutory
section 10-9-103(l)(k), this use legally existed prior to the current zoning ordinance.
Prior to annexation in 1988, the Property was used by lessee Clarence Newman to park
the large trucks and trailers used in his insulation business. As the district court found,
the County knew of, and never objected to, this use, and there is no allegation or
evidence that this use was contrary to the County zoning ordinance. (Ruling pp. 9, 11,
Add. 9, 11.) The City does not challenge these findings. Following annexation, Mr.
Newman continued to use the Property for the same purpose, as promised by the City
mayor, under the City's initial C-2 zoning designation. Upon their purchase of the
Property in 1991, Hugoes began using the Property for the same purpose, the parking of
13

trucks and trailers, under the same C-2 zoning. That zoning regulation lists "transfer
company" as one of the permitted uses. Ordinance § 11-13-1(A)(45) (PL Exh. 5, Add.
36.) The district court expressly found that Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company"
within the meaning of the C-2 zoning ordinance. (Ruling pp. 14-16; Conclusion of Law
8; Add. 14-16, 27.) Moreover, as the district court also found, Hugoes obtained an
assurance from the City prior to purchase that their proposed use was permitted by the
zoning; they obtained a fill permit from the City to facilitate their known use of the
Property; and the City, knowing of Hugoes' use, never objected to that use or gave any
indication that the use was contrary to the C-2 zoning. (Ruling pp. 2-4, 9-10; Findings of
Fact 10-12, 15-17; Add. 2-4, 9-10, 22-24.) The City does not challenge these findings.
Based on these findings, Hugoes' use of the Property "legally existed" when the zoning
was changed, as the district court correctly concluded. (Ruling pp. 14-16; Conclusions
of Law 7-10; Add. 14-16, 27-28.) The parties do not dispute the second and third
elements of the definition for nonconforming use. (Id.) Therefore, Hugoes have a valid
and vested nonconforming use that may continue under the new zoning law.
Utah case law amply supports this conclusion of nonconforming use. For
example, in Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967), the
subject property had historically been used for the excavation of sand and gravel, but in
1957 the property was zoned residential. Extraction activities continued, and the plaintiff
acquired the property two years later with the expectation of continuing such use under
the prior nonconforming use statute, section 10-9-6 (Add. 46). Id. at 561 n.l. The
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plaintiff continued excavation activities until the city issued a stop order. The plaintiff
then sued to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. Following a trial, the district court
ruled that because the property had been used for excavation prior to the zoning
ordinance, "any prohibition of use would be unreasonable and confiscatory and would
result in the taking of private property without due process." Id. at 561. The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding the nonconforming use statute "determinative." Id. at 562. In
light of the existing use of the property, the potential financial loss to the owner, and the
absence of any compelling public interest in enforcing the new ordinance, the court
concluded that enforcement would be "an invalid exercise of the police power." Id. at
563-64. The court rejected the city's arguments that the plaintiff had extended its
excavation to this property after the zoning ordinance, that the plaintiff had purchased the
property with full knowledge of the zoning restriction, and that zoning law favors
elimination of nonconforming uses. Id. at 564. The plaintiffs continued excavation on
the property "was a valid nonconforming use." Id. at 565.
The same result is even more compelling in the present case because Hugoes
purchased their Property with the understanding and assurance that parking of trucks and
trailers was permitted by the current zoning. Moreover, that use of the Property has not
changed from what it was prior to annexation, prior to Hugoes' purchase, and prior to the
zoning change, or what it has been since the zoning change. As in Gibbons & Reed,
enforcement of the zoning ordinance in this case would cause severe financial hardship
to Hugoes, while serving none of the public interests zoning is intended to serve. The
15

Property is surrounded by similar businesses, and the commercial character of the area
has not changed since the Hugoes' purchase in 199L (Tr. 28-29, 56-57, 155.) The City
has identified no adverse consequence from allowing Hugoes to continue their
nonconforming use. On these facts, the district court properly enjoined enforcement of
the new zoning ordinance to prohibit Hugoes' use of their Property. See Gibbons &
Reed, supra, at 561-62; Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah 1977)
(upholding nonconforming use in keeping farm animals on residential property); Rock
Manor Trust v. State Road Commission, 550 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1976) (upholding
nonconforming use of barn wall for commercial advertising even after barn burned and
was rebuilt); Clinton City v. Patterson, 433 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah 1967) (upholding
nonconforming use of land for cattle feedlot and pasture); Swenson v. Salt Lake City, 398
P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1965) (vested right to nonconforming use of carport).
Because the right to a nonconforming use is considered a "vested right," 4 The
Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, § 51.01 [2], the district court's judgment in favor of
Hugoes is also supported by the analogous case of Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of
Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). There, a residential developer applied for approval of
a subdivision that was permitted by current zoning. The city denied approval and then
changed its zoning to prohibit the subdivision. Id. at 389-90. The court held that the city
illegally withheld subdivision approval because the developer acquired a vested right to
approval at the time of his application, if the development met the zoning requirements in
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effect at that time. Id. at 396. The court acknowledged the need to balance the public
and private interests in the area of land use and development:
A property owner should be able to plan for developing his property in a
manner permitted by existing zoning regulations with some degree of
assurance that the basic ground rules will not be changed in midstream....
An applicant for approval of a planned and permitted use should not be
subject to shifting policies that do not reflect serious public concerns. [Id.]
Similarly, Hugoes acquired a vested right when they began using their Property to park
trucks and trailers in conformance with the current zoning in 1991. That right was
strengthened by the City's issuance of the fill permit, approving the Property
improvements that enabled the proposed use. To allow the City, now, to change the rules
of use "midstream" on the basis of "shifting policies that do not reflect serious public
concerns" would constitute an unlawful exercise of the police power and deprive Hugoes
of their vested right.
C.

City Arguments Against Nonconforming Use
As noted, the City does not challenge any findings of fact and has not marshaled

the evidence to demonstrate that any particular finding is "clearly erroneous." Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a). Accordingly, the findings of fact, as well as the legal conclusions that
necessarily follow therefrom, must be accepted on appeal. See, e.g., West Valley City v.
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) (appellant city failed to
catalogue evidence in support of any challenged finding to demonstrate that such finding
was "clearly erroneous").
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The City argues that Hugoes have no vested nonconforming use because their use
was not legally established prior to the zoning change. The City then offers various
reasons why Hugoes' use of the Property was not legal. (Br. of App. 29-35.) However,
none of those supposed reasons is valid.
The City first argues that its C-2 zoning ordinance limited uses within that zone to
"retail-type businesses," and that Hugoes were not conducting any business on the
Property, but merely using it to park trucks, while conducting "business" in their West
Bountiful office. (Br. of App. 30-31.) This argument borders on the frivolous. The City
fails to mention that the Hugoes' business office, while located in West Bountiful, is only
two lots away from the Property at issue. (Tr. 46.) Moreover, because the Hugoes'
business is trucking, the parking and staging of those trucks on the Property is an integral
part of their business. See Gibbons & Reed, supra, 431 P.2d at 564 (property on which
construction company stored gravel excavated from other parcels "was an integral part of
the gravel operation"). In any event, Hugoe Trucking is every bit as much a "retail-type
business" as a bus depot, wholesale ice store, dental laboratory, fire station, rescue
mission, or the other permitted uses listed under the C-2 zoning ordinance. (See PL Exh.
5, Add. 35.)
The City next asserts that a trucking business is not a permitted use under the C-2
zoning ordinance. (Br. of App. 31.) However, as noted above, the district court
expressly found that a trucking company is a "transfer company" within the meaning of
the zoning ordinance. Section 11-13-1(A)(45) (Add. 36.) The court cited several cases
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equating a "transfer company" with a transportation or trucking company. (Ruling pp.
14-15, Add. 14-15.) See, e.g., Armco Steel v. City of Kansas City, 883 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Mo.
1994) ("a transfer company includes any company in the business of transporting freight
or other products for hire"). The City makes no attempt to challenge the district court's
finding or to distinguish the cited authorities. Moreover, zoning "provisions permitting
property uses should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Patterson,
supra, 893 P.2d at 606. Therefore, this Court must accept the district court's conclusion
that Hugoes' use of the Property was legally permitted under the prior zoning ordinance.
Alternatively, the City argues that Hugoes' use of the Property was unlawful
because they never obtained a site plan approval. (Br. of App. 31-35.) However, as the
district court ruled, a site plan is required only for construction of buildings or for
proposed uses "that change the character and use of the land." (Ruling p. 11, Add. 11.)
A site plan is not required "every time a business property is sold and new owners use the
property for essentially the same purpose." {Id.) The City does not challenge that
conclusion, but argues in response that Hugoes' use of the Property "is obviously
markedly different" from the prior use by Clarence Newman. (Br. of App. 32; see also
pp. 34-35.) However, the City employs unsupported hyperbole in place of facts. The
district court found that Mr. Newman used the Property "to park semi-trucks and trailers
and large insulation trucks." (Ruling p. 2; see also Finding of Fact 6; Add. 2, 21.) Based
on this finding, which the City does not challenge, the district court specifically
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concluded that Hugoes needed no building permit or site plan approval to continue that
same use:
Plaintiffs needed no building permit to use the land in the manner in which
it had always been used . . . . As to defendant's argument that a "site plan"
was needed to be legal, the Court cannot agree. The only thing that
changed when ownership changed was the name and shape of the trucks
being parked on the land. [Ruling pp. 10-11, Add. 10-11.]
Accordingly, because the City accepts the premise that only a change in use triggers the
site plan requirement (Br. of App. 35), and the City fails even to attempt to marshal the
evidence to challenge the court's finding that Hugoes did not change the use of the
Property, it follows that no site plan was required to validate Hugoes' use. Therefore,
Hugoes' use of the Property was valid prior to the zoning change. *
Finally, the City argues that Hugoes acquired no vested right under the case of
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, discussed above, because the fill permit did
not commit the Property to any particular use. (Br. of App. 36-37.) However, as noted
above, Hugoes acquired a vested right when they commenced their valid use of the
Property under the prior zoning ordinance, independent of the subsequent fill permit.
Under the rationale of Western Land Equities, the City's granting of the fill permit, with

1

Even if a site plan approval were required, the district court would still be justified in finding a
valid nonconforming use on the basis that Hugoes would have been entitled to approval under the prior
zoning ordinance. For example, in City of New York v. Victory Van Lines, Inc., 418 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App.
Div. 1979), the court held that parking of vans and trucks on a moving company's premises was a valid
nonconforming use even though the company had failed to obtain a required permit for such parking.
Because the company would have been entitled to such a permit if requested, the court would not allow a
"technical irregularity" to prevent the continuance of an otherwise lawful use. Id. at 795. See also
Hooper v. City of St. Paul, 353 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. 1984) (violation of a technical permit
requirement does not render a prior nonconforming use unlawful).
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knowledge of the ongoing use, served to ratify and strengthen Hugoes' vested right. In
Western Land Equities, the vested right to approval occurred upon the filing of the
application, without official approval of the application. 617 P.2d at 392, 396. The
vested right in the present case, then, is reaffirmed and even more secure following actual
issuance of the permit that authorized the substantial Property improvements.
In summary, Hugoes' parking of trucks and trailers on their Property is a vested
nonconforming use because it legally existed before the zoning change in 1992. As
noted, the parties do not dispute the remaining two elements of the nonconforming use
definition. Therefore, such use of the Property "may be continued," and the City's
efforts to stop that use are properly enjoined.
POINT II:

A.

ALTERNATIVELY, ZONING ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES THE CITY
FROM ENFORCING THE NEW ZONING ORDINANCE AGAINST
THE HUGOES.

Law of Zoning Estoppel
Properly rights in the zoning context may also vest by application of equitable

estoppel, or "zoning estoppel." Under the doctrine of zoning estoppel, a property
owner's rights may be deemed vested, precluding enforcement of a zoning ordinance in a
particular case, when the owner acted in good faith reliance on the city's actions,
inaction, assurances, or current zoning in expending significant sums to improve or
develop the property for a planned and permitted use, such that enforcement would be
unfair under all the circumstances. Zoning estoppel may also be justified where there is
bad faith or inequitable conduct by city officials, and no substantial public interest would
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be served by enforcement of the ordinance in the particular case. See generally 4 The
Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, § 50.05.
The doctrine of zoning estoppel is firmly embedded in Utah law. The Utah
Supreme Court, in Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, supra, acknowledged
that "zoning estoppel... is widely followed" and described its application as follows:
That principle estops a government entity from exercising its zoning
powers to prohibit a proposed land use when a property owner, relying
reasonably and in good faith on some governmental act or omission, has
made a substantial change in position or incurred such extensive
obligations or expenses that it would be highly inequitable to deprive the
owner of his right to complete his proposed development. [617 P.2d at
391.]
The court observed that "[t]he main inquiry is whether there has been substantial reliance
by the owner on governmental actions related to the superseded zoning that permitted the
proposed use." Id. The specific concern is the "economic hardship that would be
imposed on a property owner" whose use of the property is thwarted. Id. For example,
in Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1964), the court held that a zoning
ordinance requiring a certain size of lots could not equitably be enforced against a
developer who had already provided water and sewer connections for smaller lots in
conformance with a prior ordinance. Similar statements of the elements of zoning
estoppel are set forth in other Utah cases. See, e.g., Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d
283, 290 (Utah App. 1994); Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980).
See also Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990)
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(State Retirement Board equitably estopped to require retiree to "purchase" his retirement
benefit when he had been informed prior to retirement that no purchase was necessary).
B.

Application to Present Case
As held by the district court, the facts of the present case justify application of

zoning estoppel to prevent enforcement of the new zoning ordinance against Hugoes. In
1988, the City mayor induced Hugoes' predecessor, Frank Branch, and the owner of the
Adjacent Parcel, Richard Fleming, to support annexation with the assurance that their
current use of their properties to park trucks and related equipment would be permitted
under City zoning and could continue following annexation. Mrs. Hugoe also heard, and
later relied on, these assurances in purchasing the Property from Mr. Branch. (Ruling p.
2; Findings of Fact 9; Add. 2, 22.) Prior to purchasing the Property in 1991, Mrs. Hugoe
informed the City zoning administrator, Tim Stephens, of her proposed use of the
Property and of her desire to verify that such use was permitted by current zoning. Mr.
Stephens provided her with the C-2 zoning ordinance and tacitly approved her
conclusion that parking of trucks was permitted under that zoning. (Ruling pp. 2-3;
Findings of Fact 10-11; Add. 2-3, 22.) Mrs. Hugoe also observed that the Property and
Adjacent Parcel were currently being used to park trucks and related equipment, as
permitted by the City. (Ruling p. 3; Findings of Fact 12; Add. 3, 23.) Following
Hugoes' purchase of the Property, the City Public Works Director came onto the
Property, observed that fill material was being hauled in to accommodate the parking of
trucks, and stated that a fill permit was required. In compliance, Mrs. Hugoe went to the
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City office and informed Tim Stephens that she desired a permit to fill the Property for
the parking of her trucks. Mr. Stephens issued the permit, assuring Mrs. Hugoe that her
use of the Property was "totally legal." (Tr. 64; Ruling pp. 3-4; Findings of Fact 14-15;
Add. 3-4, 23.) In reliance on this permit, the various assurances, and the absence of any
statement or indication from the City that their use was illegal, Hugoes expended over
$200,000 in filling and improving the Property for the parking of trucks and related
vehicles. (Tr. 94; Ruling p. 4; Findings of Fact 18-19; Add. 4, 24.) The City made no
objection to the Hugoes' use of their Property until March 1992, after the new 1-1 zoning
ordinance was passed. (Ruling pp. 4-5; Findings of Fact 21-22; Add. 4-5, 24-25.) 2
The foregoing facts support zoning estoppel. The Hugoes relied reasonably and
in good faith on the mayor's assurances prior to annexation, the City's acquiescence in
the parking of trucks on the Property following annexation, the zoning administrator's
approval of that same use prior to purchase and upon issuing the fill permit, the permit
itself, and the absence of any objection from the City until March 1992. Hugoes made a
substantial change in position by purchasing the Property for the purpose of parking their
trucks and related vehicles, and they incurred substantial expense in improving the

2

The district court acknowledged a conflict in the evidence on whether Mr. Stephens informed Mrs.
Hugoe of the need for a site plan approval at the time of issuing the fill permit. Mr. Stephens produced a
"contemporaneous" memorandum to his file stating that he "made clear" that site plan approval was
required before the Property could be used for any purpose. (Def. Exh. 1.) Mrs. Hugoe denied that there
was any discussion or mention of site plan approval. (Tr. 64-65.) The district court disbelieved Mr.
Stephens, noting that he had no memory of the discussion (Tr. 110), that his production of the
memorandum was "convenient" (Ruling pp. 4, 10), and that a matter of such importance should have
been noted on the fill permit itself (id.). The court expressly found that Mrs. Hugoe's testimony was
more credible, and that Mr. Stephens' testimony regarding a site plan requirement was untrue. (Findings
of Fact 16, Add. 23-24.)
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Property for that specific use. Accordingly, "it would be highly inequitable" and would
cause extreme "economic hardship," including loss of their investment and their business
(Tr. 80-82), now to deprive Hugoes of the continued use of their Property. See Western
Land Equities, supra, at 391.
After carefully reviewing these facts (Ruling pp.9-11), the district court concluded
that the elements of zoning estoppel were satisfied (id. at 12-13). Specifically, the court
concluded that Mr. Stephens' issuance of the fill permit, with full knowledge of the use
of the Properly, justified Hugoes in proceeding with that use. In addition, Stephens'
failure to inform the Hugoes that their use was unlawful at the time of issuing the fill
permit, despite Mrs. Hugoe's specific inquiry as to legality, constituted "a negligent
omission by one who had a duty to act." (Id. at 12.) The court found "evidence only of
good faith on the part of plaintiffs" in their "extensive" reliance on Stephens' acts and
omissions in proceeding with improvement and use of the Property. (Id. at 13.) Finally,
the court concluded that Hugoes satisfied any duty of inquiry by inspecting the Property
and zoning ordinance prior to purchase, and by verifying their legal status with the City's
zoning administrator when they obtained the fill permit. (Id. at 13; see Conclusions of
Law 1-6, Add. 13, 25-27.) These findings and conclusions satisfy the elements of zoning
estoppel. See Utah County v. Young, supra, 615 P.2d at 1267-68; City of Coral Gables
v. Puiggros, 418 So. 2d 367 (Fla. App. 1982) (zoning estoppel based on expenditure of
funds in reliance on assurance of city that use would be permitted); Drain v. Clackamas
County, 585 P.2d 746 (Or. App. 1978) (estoppel based on delay in enforcement of
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zoning requirements); Lefrak Forest Hills Corp. v. Galvin, 338 N.Y.S.2d 932 (App. Div.
1972), affd, 298 N.E.2d 685 (N.Y. 1973) (estoppel based on prior approval of use and
issuance of permit).
In summary, the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law fully
support application of zoning estoppel to preserve the Hugoes' vested right in the use of
their Property. Moreover, because the City has failed to challenge any finding of fact by
marshaling the evidence to demonstrate that any finding is clearly erroneous, the
conclusions of law that follow therefrom must also be sustained. See West Valley City v.
Majestic Investment Co., supra, 818 P.2d at 1315.
C.

City Arguments Against Zoning Estoppel
The City argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that Tim Stephens

had a duty to inform Mrs. Hugoe of any problem with her use of the Property at the time
of issuing the fill permit. (Br. of App. 13-17.) However, the cases cited by the City are
distinguishable.
In Utah County v. Young, supra, the property owner knew that commercial use of
his bam was unlawful under the zoning, misrepresented the proposed use in his building
application, and proceeded with construction anyway in the hope that the zoning would
be changed. Moreover, the jury found that no one from the county lead the owner to
believe his use was lawful. The court held that "estoppel may not be used as a defense
by one who has acted fraudulently, or in bad faith, or with knowledge." 615 P.2d at
1267. By contrast, in the present case Hugoes believed that their use was permitted by
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the zoning, and that belief was based not only on their observations of the same use by
others, but on Mr. Stephens' issuance of the fill permit, with knowledge that the fill was
related to their specific use, on his assurance that Hugoes were "totally legal," and on his
failure to inform them that their use was not legal, if in fact it was not. Accordingly,
estoppel here is based on an affirmative act, an affirmative statement, and an omission
on which Hugoes relied to their detriment. As stated in Young and Western Land
Equities, estoppel can be based on either an act or an omission. If based on an omission,
Young requires "a negligent or culpable omission where the party failing to act was under
a duty to do so." Id. at 1267-68. The district court here correctly concluded that
Stephens did have such a duty (Ruling p. 12; Conclusion of Law 2), because he knew of
the actual use, and Mrs. Hugoe did specifically "inquire and confer" with Stephens, the
City's "zoning authority [,] regarding the uses of the property that would be permitted," as
required by Young. Id. at 1268. If the law imposes on the owner "a duty to inquire,"
then certainly it imposes on the zoning authority "a duty to respond" to that inquiry. On
these facts, a failure to respond justifies application of estoppel. See, e.g., Neal v. City of
Kingman, 810 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Ariz. App. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 817 P.2d
937 (Ariz. 1991) ("government can be estopped by its silence if it knows that another is
relying to his detriment on such silence"); Town of Boulder v. Bullock, 632 P.2d 716, 720
(Mont. 1981) (zoning estoppel based on issuance of permit and failure of town to
communicate known zoning infraction); Board of Regents v. City of Seattle, 741 P.2d 11,
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16 (Wash. 1987) ("Silence coupled with knowledge of an adverse claim will estop a
party from later asserting an inconsistent claim.").3
The City also relies on Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App.
1992), for the proposition that Mr. Stephens had no duty to respond to Mrs. Hugoe's
inquiries and that she was not justified in relying on his acts or omissions. (Br. of App.
16-17.) However, in that case, estoppel was denied because the owner had used the
home as a commercial lodge "long before the clerk issued the first 'lodging facility'
business license. Thus, [the owner] has failed to show that it substantially changed its
position to its detriment." 836 P.2d at 803. In addition, the court reasoned that it was
unreasonable for the owner to rely exclusively on the errors of a "ministerial employee."
Id. By contrast, in the present case, Hugoes did rely to their detriment on Stephens9 acts,
statements, and omissions by expending over $200,000 to prepare their Property for a use
that was known to Stephens. In addition, Stephens was not a "ministerial employee," but
was the zoning administrator for the City. He personally provided Mrs. Hugoe with the
zoning information, personally discussed the proposed use, personally issued the fill
permit to facilitate that use, and personally failed to disclose that the proposed use was
unlawful, if it was. Mr. Stephens is "the local zoning authority" with whom Mrs. Hugoe

3

The two non-Utah cases relied upon by the City are also distinguishable. In Maloofv. Gwinnett
County, 200 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 1973), the county did not know that the owner was going to put his kennel
to commercial use, and no such use had been approved. Similarly, in Jackson v. Kenai Peninsula
Borough, 733 P.2d 1038 (Alas. 1987), the city never approved the owner's commercial use of his garage.
In the present case, by contrast, the City did know of Hugoes' use and approved that use tacitly prior to
purchase and expressly upon issuance of the fill permit.
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had a "duty to inquire and confer," as required by Young. The Utah Supreme Court
would not have imposed such a duty of inquiry if owners were not entitled to rely on the
information received. The result in Ben Hame Corp. is dictated by the absence of
detrimental reliance. However, the law is well established that if a zoning authority acts
in error, such as in issuing a permit, and the owner detrimentally relies, such as in
commencing construction or improvements, the owner acquires a vested right that is
protected by equitable estoppel. See 4 The Law of Zoning and Planning, supra,
§ 50.05[4].
The City argues, as a matter of public policy, that it "cannot possibly bear the
burden of informing every landowner of the relevant development requirements relating
to their property" (Br. of App. 18), and that the City does not forfeit its power of
enforcement through acquiescence. (Br. of App. 17-23.) However, this argument
misses the points relevant to the estoppel analysis. While the City has no duty to inform
"every landowner" of the proper use of their property, the City does have a duty to
inform those few who come into the City office and specifically inquire of the zoning
administrator whether their proposed use is permissible. As a matter of policy equal in
importance to that urged by the City, property owners who desire to proceed cautiously
and avoid the risk of a zoning conflict should be permitted to inquire regarding their
proposed use and should be entitled to rely on the response. Even in those cases when
the responsive action or information is erroneous, the aggrieved owner may invoke
estoppel only based on detrimental reliance. Accordingly, the rule that a city does not
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forfeit enforcement power through acquiescence is not absolute, but is tempered by
principles of equity that afford relief from enforcement in cases of sufficient detrimental
reliance, and where there is no countervailing public policy that requires enforcement.
See, e.g., Wood v. North Salt Lake, supra, 390 P.2d at 859 (lots improved in reliance on
prior approval); Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. App.
1975) ("A citizen is entitled to rely on the assurances and commitments of a zoning
authority and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations, whether
they be in the form of words or deeds.") See generally 4 The Law of Zoning and
Plmining§50.05[3]n.23. 4
Finally, the City argues that the district court erred in relying on zoning estoppel
because the word "estoppel" does not appear in the complaint and the City did not
consent to trial of the estoppel issue. (Br. of App. 23-29.) However, as demonstrated in
nearly all of the case and treatise authorities discussed by the parties, the issue of estoppel
is virtually inseparable from the theory of vested rights through nonconforming use. See
Western Land Equities, supra (discussing the similarities of estoppel and vested rights
but choosing to grant relief under vested rights); Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283
(Utah App. 1994) (discussing concepts of vested rights and estoppel under same facts);
4

Neither does application of zoning estoppel in this case establish a nonconforming use "by
prescription," nor leave the Hugoes' Property "free from any manner of local regulation." (Br. of App.
20-21.) A zoning authority is admittedly not bound by any time table or limitations period in enforcing
its zoning ordinance. However, as demonstrated by the foregoing authorities, by delaying enforcement,
the zoning authority does risk that vested rights will intervene, precluding enforcement under principles
of equitable estoppel. Moreover, while a nonconforming use may continue, it remains subject to other
zoning regulations, nuisance laws, limitations on change or expansion, and possible amortization and
termination. See generally 4 The Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, chs. 51A and 5 IB.
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Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., supra (analyzing estoppel and nonconforming use
under same facts); County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 766, 772
(Haw. 1982) ("In the land use context, the vested rights doctrine was employed
synonymously with the estoppel theory by a majority of the courts . . . . " ) ; 4 The Law of
Zoning and Planning § 50.05[4], p. 50-79 (theory of "zoning estoppel" is a "synthesis"
of the doctrine of vested rights and traditional estoppel principles). Accordingly, the
issues and evidence for the vested rights claim and zoning estoppel are the same. As
discussed above, even the legal elements of the two theories overlap, with estoppel being
applied to establish the vested rights, as done alternatively in this case. (Ruling p. 14.)
See 4 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 51.01 [2] [a] (the vested status of a use may be
achieved by equitable estoppel).
Because the issues and evidence for vested rights and estoppel are the same,
estoppel may be deemed raised by the complaint. Moreover, the City did not object to
any of the evidence in support of estoppel, and the City has identified no actual prejudice
in defending the case. Therefore, the complaint may be deemed amended, the issue was
tried by the implied consent of the parties, and the judgment may properly be based on
estoppel, as supported by the evidence. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b); Colman v. Colman,
743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987) ("If a theory of recovery is folly tried by the parties,
the court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings amended, even if
the theory was not originally pleaded

"); First Security Bank v. Colonial Ford, Inc.,

597 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1979) ("the underlying purpose of the rules is that judgment
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should be granted in accordance with the law and the evidence as the ends of justice
require"); General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976)
(implied consent for trial of issue may be found where evidence is introduced without
objection).
In summary, the City has presented no argument why zoning estoppel should not
apply in this case. The City has neither challenged any factual finding of the district
court, nor demonstrated that any legal conclusion is incorrect. Estoppel is based on the
acts, statements, and omissions of the City mayor and zoning administrator.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the judgment of the district court
on the grounds that Hugoes have a vested nonconforming use, and zoning estoppel
prevents the City from enforcing its new zoning ordinance to stop Hugoes from parking
trucks and trailers on their Property.
Respectfully submitted this / f
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIA^QKTRI"
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH V \ j
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
\
Au
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and,
HUGOE TRUCKING, INC.,
a Utah corporation
Plaintiffs,

TRIAL RULING

v.
Case No. 960700425
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of the
State of Utah,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12, 1997. Plaintiffs
were represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth. The defendant was represented by
Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court
took the case under advisement to prepare a written opinion. The Court rules as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the
south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City. 500 South is a major
East-West thoroughfare in the city.
Both parcels were previously owned by Mr. Frank Branch. In December of 1988 both
parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City.
Prior to December 1988 the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis
County. Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. He obtained permission

0000002

from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to haul in
fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a result
of the 1983 flooding.
Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985, he
has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps and various other pieces of heavy
equipment.
Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the years
from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property.
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers
and large insulation trucks.
The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and
clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until
present.
In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr. Branch
and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then mayor, Mr. Argyle, and attended
several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation, with the assurance
that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Hugoe also attended
some of these same meetings with her aunt, also a resident of the area.
Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in the property and Ms. Hugoe went to the
Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with Mr. Stephens, the
Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning ordinance, which showed
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the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone was a "transfer
company."
Mr. Stephens had been employed as the Community Development Director for Woods
Cross City since 1989. Before that he worked in the planning department of Davis County. In
his position with Davis County he was familiar with the unincorporated area of the county.
Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that they were a trucking company. Trucks bearing the
Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from
the road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business.
Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the property
was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the zoning
use.
Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11, 1991 and immediately began parking their
trucks on their property.
Shortly after purchase they began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from projects
they were working on in the city. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms. Hugoe that they
needed a fill permit to place fill on the property.
On August 12,1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to get a fill permit.
She talked to Mr. Stephens; he informed her that the city had just adopted the fill ordinance and
they were still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. They did not have a fill
permit form yet so Mr. Stephens used a building permit form. They discussed the type of fill
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they were using and that it was coming from city streets and other sources. He said it could not
contain wood or concrete. He was aware that they were a trucking company.
Ms. Hugoe testified that Mr. Stephens said nothing about plaintiffs not being able to use
the property for parking trucks or that they needed a site plan.
Mr. Stephens said he could not remember discussing that with her but conveniently
produced a memo to the file stating he told her that she needed a site plan and gave her a site
plan application.
The permit itself makes no mention of the site plan requirement or any particular use, and
the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on
August 13, 1991, the same date that the memo to the file bears.
Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of the property hauling in approximately 100
truck loads of fill, which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the
parking of their trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it was
over $100,000.
All fill was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their purchase of the property
they continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill operation temporarily required
them to move their trucks they parked them on the Fleming property next door.
Use of the property by plaintiff to park trucks was consistent with other property uses in
the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed
very little over the years.
In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which
changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to I-l, light industrial.
4
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On March 27,1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing them
for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20,1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs
refused to comply with the order and after numerous demands over the years, on November 13,
1997, defendant's attorney sent a letter to plaintiffs. The letter stated that unless they complied
within 14 days court action would be started to force compliance.
As a result of that letter this action was filed by plaintiffs and this trial ensued.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court rules as follows:
RULING
Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to continue the use they now make of the property,
which consists primarily of a storage yard for their trucks and trailers, through the operation of
estoppel, occasioned by defendants acts and omissions, as a non-conforming use under the
defendants' new zoning ordinance. Plaintiff also must prove the use of their land meets the legal
requirements to be considered a non-conforming use. Therefore, although both issues are
interrelated, the Court will address the estoppel issue first, as a determination in plaintiffs' favor
on the estoppel issue helps satisfy one of the elements required under non-conforming use.
ESTOPPEL
Current Utah law relating to zoning estoppel is primarily set forth in two opinions of the
Utah Supreme Court: Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); and Western Land
Equities v. City of Logan. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). Peculiarly, although the two cases were
released only one month apart, there is no mention in either of the other, although the issues
discussed often overlap. Western Land, the latter of the two, discusses the law of zoning
5
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estoppel as if no Utah court, let alone the very same court a mere one month prior, had ever
addressed the issue, citing case law from other jurisdictions in illustrating possible approaches to
the issue. The Western Land Court ultimately concludes that an application of zoning estoppel
would not be correct in that case, proceeding instead to analyze the case under a "vested right"
theory, certainly related, but not quite the same. The Court states:
In rejecting the zoning estoppel approach in this matter, we are not prepared
to state that it would never be relevant to a determination of the validity of a
retroactive application of a zoning ordinance. We are of the view, however, that the
relevant public and private interests are better accommodated in the first instance by
a different approach.
Western Land. 617 P.2d at 392-393. The Court then proceeds to discuss how and when property
owners' rights to a particular use might vest. In Western Land, the facts were that the owner had
purchased the land, and then, before any construction or other use of the property commenced,
the city amended its zoning ordinance, precluding the use for which the owner had intended for
the property. Rejecting a balancing-test type approach based on a weighing of the resources
which an owner has committed to a project against the possibility of other appropriate uses of the
land and the public welfare, the Court held that:
[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his
application and if he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling,
countervailing public interest. Furthermore, if a city or county has initiated
proceedings to amend its zoning ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes
application for a permit is not entitled to rely on the original zoning classification.
Id., at 396. It appears to the Court that the facts of Western Land do not fit well with the facts of
the present case. Here, there is no dispute that a permit was indeed issued, rather than simply
applied for, although the parties dispute that permit's relevance. Plaintiffs do not seek, in this
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action, a building permit at all, rather they seek a determination that the use they presently make
of their property is legally non-conforming under the current zoning ordinance. Furthermore, as
found by the Court, the property was used the same before the ordinance was changed as it is
presently. As stated above, and addressed more fully below, to be currently legal as nonconforming, it must have been allowable under the prior zoning ordinance. The case that is most
directly controlling with respect to that issue is Utah County v. Young {supra). There the
Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of estoppel in a zoning case. There was no
intervening zoning change, as there was in Western Land, and as there is in this case, yet the
intervening zoning change is only a secondary issue in this case if the Court finds the use legal
under the prior zoning law.
The facts of Young are essentially as follows: The landowners owned property zoned for
agricultural use only. They applied to the county for a building permit, for a "J"-type nonresidential, non-public use building, such that would include a barn. The permit was issued for
the construction of a barn, with an estimated value of $1,600. The landowners thereafter
proceeded to construct a building which, although resembling a barn, included an auction block,
bleachers, commercial plumbing and wiring, and which cost $23,000, and began operating a
livestock auction. The trial court found that at the time the landowners applied for their building
permit, and all through the intervening time until the county brought the action, the landowners
"knew that such a use would not be permitted under the zoning laws, and no agent or employee
of Utah County led them to believe otherwise." The trial court stated on the matter:
The only defense presented by the defendants was that they were entitled to
the application of equitable principles to prevent the county from enjoining his use
and operation of the land as a commercial 'Auction Barn1 because of claimed
7
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misleading acts inducing his belief that on completion of the structure he would be
entitled to commercial use of it. The findings of the advisory jury, concurred in by
the Court, do not support any such misleading action, and to the contrary establish
that the defendants well-knew the zoning restrictions, and that they precluded
commercial use of the structure. Therefore, the rules of equity do not assist them in
their claim and the right of plaintiff to a permanent injunction prohibiting further
commercial use of the property is granted by the Court.
Young. 615 P.2d at 1266-67. The landowners claimed that even though they had knowledge of
the zoning laws, the alleged misleading actions of the building inspector should have entitled
them to an estoppel. On three grounds the Supreme Court ruled against the landowners. First,
the trial court found that there was no misleading by the county's agents. Second, the Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he structure, itself, which resembles a barn, does not violate the zoning laws; it
is only the commercial use thereof that is proscribed. Third, as a matter of law,
estoppel may not be used as defense by one who has acted fraudulently, or in bad
faith, or with knowledge.
Id., at 1267. The Court goes on to establish the elements of a claim of estoppel in a zoning case
as follows:
To invoke the doctrine the county must have committed an act or omission upon
which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in
position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which the developer claims
reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative nature. If the claim be based on
an omission of the local zoning authority, omission means a negligent or culpable
omission where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction
will not operate to work an estoppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
landowner has a duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding
the uses of the property that would be permitted.
Id., at 1267-68. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's
judgment against the landowners.
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Here, the facts, as stated, supra, would show an entirely different scenario than those at
issue in Young. The property in question had been historically used, first in Davis County, and
later, after being annexed into defendant Woods Cross, for the parking of trucks, the same use for
which defendant seeks an injunction. It had been so used, on a continuous basis, known to both
Davis County and defendant, for at least 6 years prior to the time it was purchased by
plaintiffs. The surrounding property owners had made similar use of their (identically-zoned)
land. Defendants' mayor had induced the prior owners of plaintiffs' land to agree to the
annexation with the assurances that they could continue using the land in the manner which that
prior owner, and current plaintiffs, were using it. Plaintiffs went to defendant's offices and
reviewed the zoning ordinance, and reasonably believed (as set forth, infra) the use they wished
to put the land to would be allowed. After purchasing the land and continuing to use it as it had
been historically used, plaintiffs began to put fill on the land to make it more acceptable for the
parking of their trucks. Part of this fill came from the rotograding of defendant's streets, a fact
known to defendant.
They were then contacted by defendant and told that they needed to get a "fill permit"
before continuing to place the fill, but, significantly, they were not told that they could not park
their trucks on the land. Plaintiff Debbie Hugoe then went to the defendant's offices and
procured the "fill permit" from Tim Stephens, defendant's director of community development.
Mr. Stephens was fully aware that plaintiffs owned and operated a trucking company, that they
parked their trucks on the subject property, and that they were obtaining the fill permit to
improve the conditions on that property for such truck parking.
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe that they
needed a site plan. Ms. Hugoe stated that there was no such mention. Mr. Stephens says he
can't remember, but he conveniently produced a memo to the file referring to a conversation
about the site plan.
The Court finds it inconsistent that an event that was so important that it triggered a
memo to the file would not have likewise triggered at least a notation or comment on the fill
permit. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on the same date as the file memo but is
silent on the issue. The comment portion is blank.
After obtaining the "fill permit," plaintiffs continued to place fill on the property,
eventually placing fill and performing grading, all with a value well over $100,000. It was only
as this work was being completed that defendant informed plaintiffs of the recent zoning change
that prohibited the use plaintiffs were making of their property. Defendants argue that no site
plan had been approved, no building permit issued, and that plaintiffs use therefore could not
have been "lawfully existing" prior to the zoning change. As support, they cite Western Land.
The Court finds little credence in their argument for several reasons. First, as set forth, supra,
Western Land is primarily concerned with the vesting of rights in instances where a zoning
changes before a use is made of a property, a scenario different than that before the Court.
Second, the "fill permit" issued by defendant was issued long after the current use was
made of the property, and was only obtained for leveling off and making the property more
serviceable under its current (and prior) use. Plaintiffs needed no building permit to use the land
in the manner in which it had always been used, in fact there were no "buildings" needed
whatsoever. As to defendant's argument that a "site plan" was needed to be legal, the Court
10
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cannot agree. The only thing that changed when ownership changed was the name and shape of
the trucks being parked on the land. There are no allegations that Davis County, the prior zoning
authority, had required a site plan and that there had been a failure to comply. There is no
evidence before the Court that the use had ever, prior to 1992, been questioned by any authority
as being anything but proper. Certainly defendants do not require a site plan every time a
business property is sold and new owners use the property for essentially the same purpose,
without major change. When minor changes are sought, a building permit, not a site plan, is
required. The language of the site plan ordinance is telling in this regard:
SITE PLAN. In any commercial or manufacturing zone, and in all zones where
construction of main buildings or dwellings other than single-family dwellings is
proposed or involved, the location of main and accessory buildings on the site and
in relation to one another, the traffic circulation features within the site, the height
and bulk of buildings, the provisions for off-street parking space, the provisions for
driveways for ingress and egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter and /or
sidewalk when not already in place along the street bordering, and provision for other
open space on the site, and the display of signs shall be in accordance with a site plan
or plans or subsequent amendment thereof, approved in any case by the Planning
Commission prior to the issuance of a Building or Land-Use permit...
(Section 11-18-9 of defendants' former City ordinances. This is the text submitted by defendant
as part of their reply memorandum to their motion for summary judgment.) It is clear that a site
plan is needed for construction purposes that change the character and use of the land, but not for
continued use of the land, by new owners, under a previously allowable use.
Third, and finally, even if the Court was to proceed under Western Land, it is undisputed
that plaintiff applied for, and obtained a "fill permit." The fill permit was granted with
defendant's knowledge that plaintiff was using the fill to be able to better park his trucks, a use
that had gone on for years prior. This Court can see no reason to limit the holding of Western

11

0000012

Land to only building permits and subdivision approvals. Other types of permits may reference
the same type of rights, such as the liquor license in Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). Defendant required plaintiffs to obtain a fill permit to place
fill, fill that plaintiffs felt was necessary to make better, but the same, use of their property. The
permit was obtained, and plaintiffs continued the same use thereafter. As plaintiffs actually
obtained the only type of "building permit" either party reasonably might argue was ever at issue
in this case, with the full knowledge of defendant that the prior use would be continued, Western
Land cannot but help plaintiffs' case, to the extent that it applies.
Reviewing the elements of estoppel set forth by Young, defendant must have:
JL

Committed an act or omission, and if an omission, it must be a negligent or

culpable omission, where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so.
The Court finds that Mr. Stephens, in first requiring and then issuing a fill permit to
plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put in the
future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same on
the fill permit, constitutes a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens'
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendants, and
a use which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had
questions or believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had
expended substantial resources.
2.

Good faith reliance on the act or omission in making substantial changes in

position or incurring extensive expenses.
12
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The Court finds that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use until
defendants informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive."
2*

Duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of

the property that would be permitted.
Plaintiff went to defendant's offices and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before
purchasing the property. The specific language of the zoning ordinance itself caused her to
reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property had been put by the prior owners,
would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the surrounding property owners
used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner, with defendant's
longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing more than a
formality to plaintiffs.
The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had a
further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the
property the same way it had been historically used, the same way surrounding property owners
used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seeming express approval of
such use.
The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to
estop defendant from arguing (or prosecuting plaintiff in a criminal or administrative case) that
plaintiffs' use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance.
13
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Legal Non-Conforming Use
To enable plaintiffs to prove they are entitled to continue their use, a use which is
indisputably not allowed as a conforming use under the current zoning ordinance, they must
show that it meets the requirement to be a non-conforming use under the applicable law. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-103(k) states:
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(I) legally existed before its current zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed; and
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.
The Court'sfindingas to the first element is set forth in the prior section, supra. As an
independent, but interrelated as it goes to the issue of plaintiffs' reasonable belief under estoppel,
grounds forfindingthe first element required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the
following: Under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property
and when they began their current use, their land was zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2
include "transfer company." The parties are in disagreement as to the definition of a "transfer
company." The zoning ordinance itself provides no definition of "transfer company," neither is
it defined by Utah statutory or case law. The Court found one case,fromMissouri, that
attempted to define its meaning. The court in Armco SteeL v. Citv of Kansas Citv. Missouri. 883
S.W.2d 3, 8-9 (Mo. 1994) states:
The term "transfer company" is defined as "a transportation company that transfers
passengers or baggage usually for a short distance between specified points or
terminals." Webster's Third International Dictionary (Unabridged) at 2427. In a
14
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broader sense used to describe certain litigants in Missouri case law, a transfer
company includes any company in the business of transporting freight or other
products for hire. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer Co., 610 S.W.2d 96 (Mo.
App. 1980); Govreau v. Farmington Transfer Co., 473 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1971);
Mason v. F.W. Strecker Transfer Co.. 409 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. 1966).
In Utah, there have been several cases dealing with "transfer companies." Sims v. Public
Service Commission 117 Utah 516; 218 P.2d 267 (Utah 1950) dealt with the "Salt Lake Transfer
Company" and its permit as a contract motor carrier to haul sugar for the "Utah-Idaho Sugar
Company" between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering
Transfer Company, v. Public Service Commission, 514 P.2d 804 (Utah 1973) dealt with a permit
dispute against the Utah P.S.C. by a contract carrier. Ostler V. Albina Transfer Company, Inc.,
781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is a personal injury action discussing an accident involving a
"truck and semitrailer unit parked on the paved shoulder of the roadway."
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking, Inc. is a contract motor carrier licensed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the State of Utah. It is the Court's ruling that Hugoe Trucking is a
"transfer company" within the meaning of defendants' prior zoning ordinance. Defendants
would like to persuade the Court that the proper classification of plaintiffs' use of their property
is one found under zone "M-2," at (E), "Equipment yards, contractor's yard and storage."
Apparently this is as a result of Hugoe trucking's frequent work with contractors, hauling
construction materials. The only evidence before the Court is that plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is
not, and never has been, a contractor.
It is clear that under Utah law:
[Zjoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-law right to
unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property uses

15

0000016

should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be
liberally construed in favor of the property owner.
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct App. 1995).
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is a trucking, and thus, "transfer" company. Nowhere in the prior
zoning ordinance is there a specific mention of any zone designated for "trucking company."
The only possibility is under "transfer company." The Court therefore finds that the use of
plaintiffs' property prior to the zoning change was "legally existing."
It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court
also finds that the use was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were parked offsite to enable thefillingand grading process, yet such would not constitute a "discontinuance."
The Court has been unable to find Utah case law on the issue, but a State of Washington case
dealing with discontinuance in a non-conforming use stated:
The mere temporary cessation of a nonconforming use, however, does not
effect abandonment or discontinuance of the nonconforming use. 8 A E. McQuillin,
The Law of Municipal Corporations @ 25.196 (3d ed. rev. 1976).
Andrew v. King County. 586 P.2d 509, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). Therefore, to the extent that
it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was "maintained continuously since the time the
zoning regulation governing the land changed."
The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that
plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property is a legal non-conforming use. As such, the
Court would find in favor of plaintiffs and enjoin any further action by defendant not consistent
with this ruling.
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Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare findings and judgment in accordance with the
Court's Ruling and send a copy to opposing counsel at least 5 days before being submitted to the
Court for signature.
Dated May 1^,1998
BY THE COURT:

RODNEY SrPAGE
DISTRICT JUDGE
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I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on May
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Gregory M. Simonsen
Clark B.Fetzer
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and
HUGOE TRUCKING INC., a Utah
corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 960700425

WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of the
State of Utah,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12,1997. Plaintiffs were
represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. The
defendant was represented by Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey of the lawfirmof Mazuran &
Hayes. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court took the case under advisement
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to prepare a written opinion. On May 19,1998, the Court issued a Trial Ruling in favor of plaintiffs.
The Court now enters these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the

south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah. The
street known as 500 South is a major East-West thoroughfare in the city.
2.

The legal description of Plaintiff s property is as follows:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26f East 330 feet and West 235.8 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street;
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning.
AND
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' West and North 0°26f East 330 feet and West
105.8 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet;
thence South 670.14 feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65
feet along said street; thence North 670.14 feet to the point of
beginning.
ALSO:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 170.8 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street;
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning.
ALSO:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 660 feet
Westfromthe Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North,
2
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Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence North 330 feet;
thence West 72.8 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence East 72.8 feet to
the point of beginning.
Hereafter this parcel shall be referred to as "the property" or "plaintiffs' property."
3.

Both plaintiffs' parcel and Mr. Fleming's parcel were previously owned by Mr. Frank

Branch.
4.

In December of 1988 both parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City. Prior to

December 1988, the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis County.
5.

Mr. Fleming purchased his parcelfromMr. Branch in 1985. Mr. Fleming obtained

permission from Davis County to place a culvert infrontof his property to allow better access and to
haul in fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the propertyfromDavis County retention basins as a
result of the 1983 flooding.
6.

Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985,

he has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps, and various other pieces of heavy
equipment.
7.

Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the

years from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property.
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers
and large insulation trucks.

3
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8.

The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and

clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until
present.
9.

In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr.

Branch and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then Woods Cross City mayor, Mr.
Argyle, and attended several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation,
with the assurance that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Debbie
Hugoe also attended some of these same meetings with her aunt who was a resident of the area.
10.

Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in purchasing the property, and Ms.

Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with
Mr. Tim Stephens, the Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning
ordinance, which showed the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone
was a "transfer company."
11.

Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that she operated a trucking company. Trucks bearing

the Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from the
road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business.

4
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12.

Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the

property was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the
zoning use.
13.

Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11,1991 and immediately began parking

their trucks on their property.
14.

Shortly after purchase, plaintiffs began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from

projects they were working on in Woods Cross City. A Scott Andersonfromthe city informed Ms.
Hugoe that they needed afillpermit to place fill on the property.
15.

On August 12,1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to obtain a fill

permit. She talked to Mr. Stephens about the permit. Mr. Stephens informed her that the city had
just adopted the fill ordinance and was still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. The
city had not yet designed a preprinted fill permit form, so Mr. Stephens used a preprinted building
permit form. Mr. Stephens and Ms. Hugoe discussed the type of fill plaintiffs were using and that
the fill was comingfromcity streets and other sources. He was aware that Ms. Hugoe's business,
Hugoe Trucking, Inc, was a trucking company.
16.

At trial there was conflicting evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe

that a site plan was required for the property. The court having weighed the credibility of the
witnesses and the evidencefindsthat Ms. Hugoe's testimony that no site plan was discussed is the

5
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most credible. Hence, the courtfindsthat Mr. Stevens did not tell Ms. Hugoe of any site plan
requirement.
17.

The fill permit issued to Ms. Hugoe by Woods Cross City makes no mention of the

site plan requirement or any particular use, and the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill
permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on August 13,1991.
18.

Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of their property by hauling in approximately

100 truck loads of fill which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the
parking of plaintiffs' trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it andfinishit
was over $100,000.
19.

The filling of the property was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their

purchase of the property, plaintiffs continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill
operation temporarily required them to move their trucks, plaintiffs parked their trucks on the
neighboring Fleming property.
20.

The plaintiffs' use of the property to park trucks was consistent with other property

uses in the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed
very little over the years.
21.

In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which

changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to 1-1, light industrial.

6
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22.

On March 27,1992, plaintiffs received a letterfromWoods Cross City informing

plaintiffs for thefirsttime that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20,1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs
refused to comply with the order, and after numerous demands over the years, defendant's attorney
sent a letter to plaintiffs on November 13,1997. The letter stated that if plaintiffs did not comply
within 14 days, court action would be initiated to force compliance.
23.

As a result of that letter this action was filed by the plaintiffs and this trial ensued.

From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the plaintiffs have established the elements for zoning estoppel

set forth in Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980).
2.

The Court finds that Mr. Stephens' actions in first requiring and then issuing a fill

permit to plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put
in the future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same
on the fill permit, constitute a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens'
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendant, and a use
which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had questions or
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believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had expended
substantial resources.
3.

The Court also concludes that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of the

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use
until defendant informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive."
4.

The court alsofindsthat plaintiffs inquired and consulted zoning authorities and

reviewed zoning ordinances regarding use of the property. Ms. Hugoe went to defendant's offices
and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before purchasing the property. The specific language of
the zoning ordinance itself caused her to reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property
had been put by the prior owners, would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the
surrounding property owners, used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner,
with defendant's longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing
more than a formality to plaintiffs.
5.

The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had

a further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the
property the same way it had been historically used and the same way surrounding property owners

8
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used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seemingly express approval of such
use.
6.

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to

estop defendant from arguing in this action (or any criminal or administrative action) that plaintiffs'
use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance.
7.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have met the requirements to establish a valid pre-

existing nonconforming use.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-9-103(k) states:

(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed; and
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.
8.

The Court's conclusion that the use legally existed before the current zoning is set

forth in the prior section. As an independent, but interrelated, grounds forfindingthe first element
required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the following: Under the zoning ordinances
in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property and began their current use, the property was
zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2 include "transfer company." It is the Court's ruling that
Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company" within the meaning of defendant's prior zoning ordinance
and that Hugoe Trucking's use of the property was and is consistent with this designation.

9
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9.

It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court

also finds that the use of the property was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning
regulation governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were
parked off-site to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a
"discontinuance." Therefore, to the extent that it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was
"maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed."
10.

The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that

plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property to park trucks in conjunction with their trucking
business is a legal, non-conforming use.
III. JUDGMENT
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Court rules that plaintiffs fall
within the definition of a "transfer company" under the C-2 zoning in effect at the time plaintiffs
purchased the property. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to continue to use their property in a manner
consistent with this designation, including storing and parking trucks in conjunction with plaintiffs'
business. The Court permanently enjoins defendant from taking any action to prohibit or prevent
plaintiffs from using the property in this manner. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs pursuant to
applicable court rules.

10
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DATED this S ^ day of

, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Rodney S. Ealge
District Judge

a
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s

f-

Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669)
Clark B.Fetzer (#1069)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and
HUGOE TRUCKING INC., a Utah
corporation,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960700425
vs.

Judge Rodney S. Page

WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of the
State of Utah,
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came before the court on Tuesday, December 16,1997 for
hearing on defendant Woods Cross City's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs Damon
Hugoe, Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc.'s cross-motion for summary judgment. At the
hearing the plaintiffs were represented by Gregory M. Simonsen and the defendants were represented
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by Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey. The court, having previously reviewed the memoranda,
exhibits and affidavits submitted by the parties and having heard argument of counsel finds that
genuine issues of fact remain making it necessary to deny both motions for summary judgment.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that defendant Woods Cross City's motion for summary
judgment and plaintiffs Damon Hugoe, Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc.'s cross-motion for
summary judgment are denied.
DATED this IH** day of January, 1998.
BY THE COURT

HonorabkJRodney S. Page
District Court Judge
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1555 SOUTH 800

WEST

•

WOODS CROSS, UTAH

84087 • (801)292-4421 •

FAX

292-2225

March 27, 1992

Damon Hugoe
945 West 4 00 North
West Bountiful, Utah

84 087

Dear Mr. Hugoe:
Some time ago, this City granted to you a fill permit to fillyour property located on 500 South in Woods Cross. Since that
time, it has come to our attention that the property is being used
for the storage and use of large equipment, dump trucks and
building materials. You need to be aware that this property is
zoned 1-1 Light Industrial, which does not permit open storage
yards.
The City, therefore request that you cease and desist using
the property in the above described manner no later than April 20,
1992, In addition, you should be aware that prior to making use of
this property, it is required proper site plan review, approvals,
etc.br received from the City.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel
free to contact me.
Sincerely,

Tim Stephens
Zoning Administrator
TS:lg
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CHAPTER 13
OOHMERCIAL ZONE C~2
11-12-1:

Use Regulations

11-13-2:

Special Provisions

11-13-3:

Area and Frontage Regulations

11-13-4:

Yard Regulations

11-13-5:

Height Regulations

11-13-6:

Coverage Regulations

11-13-7:

Fencing

11-13-8:

Bond

11-13-1: USg BBCTLATIOHS. In Commercial Zone C-2, no building or land shall
be used, and no building shall be erected which is arranged, intended or
designed to be used for other than one or more of the following uses:

(A) pgfrttTTSD SBM*
(1) Any permitted use allowed in Commercial Zone C~l.
(2) Apartment hotel; apartment motel.
— '") Automobile and trailer sales.
., Awning sales and repair,
^(6) Automobile rental agency*
(6) Baths•
(7) Bird store.
(8) Blueprinting or photostating.
(9) Bus depot.
(10) Business college or private school operated as a
commercial enterprise.
(11) Cleaning establishment.
(12) Department store.
(13) Dressmaking shop for retail sales at said shop*
(14) Electrical and heating equipment.
(16) Employment agency.
(16) Film exchange.
(17) Fix-it shop.
(18) Flooring or floor repair shop.
(19) Fur sales, storage and/or repair.
(20) Furniture store.
^^^mmmK^mmm
# f PLAINTIFFS BCHIBII |
• •EXHIBITNO.
!=f5L- —
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(21)-.Greenhouse and/or nursery; plant materials, soil and lawn
service, provided that all incidental equipment and
supplies, including fertilizer and empty cans, etc. are
kept within a building.
(22) Hospitals (except animal) or sanitariums.
(23) Hotel.
(24) Ice storage, and retail and wholesale ice stores.
(25) Laundry.
(26) Lodge.
(27) Manufacture of goods to be sold a£ retail on the premises.
(28) Medical or dental laboratories.
(29) Music conservatory; music instruction.
(30) Mortuary.
(31) Pet shop or taxidermist.
(32) Plumbing or sheet metal supply shop if conducted wholly
within a completely enclosed building.
(33) Printing, lithography or publishing.
~^(34) Public garage, including automobile repairing and
incidental body and fender work, painting and upholstering
if all operations are conducted wholly within a completely
enclosed building.
(35) Police or fire station*
(36) Public services, excepting electric distributing station.
(37) Rescue mission.
(38) Retail stores or businesses.
(39) Second hand store, if conducted wholly within a completely
enclosed building.
(40) Sign manufacturing shops, including neon, if conducted
wholly within a completely enclosed building.
(41) Studios (except motion picture).
(42) Telephone exchange.
—(43) Tire shop operated wholly within a building.
(44) Travel bureau.
^(45) Transfer company.
(46) Upholstering shop, if conducted wholly within a completely
enclosed building.
(47) Wedding chapel.
(48) Wholesale merchandise broker, excluding wholesale storage.
^(49) Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the
above.
(B) CONDITIONAL USES.:
(1) Any conditional use permitted in Commercial Zone C-l.
(2) Amusement enterprises, including a billiard or pool hall,
bowling alley, dance hall, or theater auditorium,
foxing arena.
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(5) Circus or amusement enterprise of similar type, transient
in character*
(6) Electric substation.
(7) Games of skill and science.
(8) Monument works, retail.
(9) _Penny arcade.
(10) Planning Mill and cabinet shop.
(11) Pony riding ring, without stables.
(12) Shooting gallery.
(13) Small animal hospital.
(14) Storage building for household goods and equipment;
— - — - mini-warehouses.
(15) Taverns; night clubs; beer parlors.
(16) Temporary revival church.
(17) Trade school, if not objectionable due to noise, odor,
vibration, etc.
"—(18) Trailer camps for trailers and mobile homes mounted on
wheels for ready movement or transport.
(19) Veterinary.
11-13-2
SPBCIAL PROVISIONS. The above specified stores, shops or businesses
shall be retail establishments and shall be permitted only under the following
conditions:
(A) Such businesses shall be conducted wholly within an enclosed
building, or on a lot which is enclosed by a solid wall, board
fence or evergreen hedge not less than 6 feet in height, except
for the sale of gasoline and oil by service stations, the
parking of automobiles, and service to persons in automobiles.
(B)

All products produced, whether primary or incidental, shall be
sold at retail on the premises; and no entertainment, except
ausic, shall be permitted in cafes, confectioneries, or
refreshment 8tanda,

(C) Any exterior sign display shall pertain only to a use conducted
within the building or lot or shall appertain to the lease or
the sale of the property; such sign shall be attached flat
against the wall of the building parallel to its horizontal
dimension and shall not exceed 100 square feet in area. One
such sign only »ay be permitted on each wall facing on a
street. In no case shall nay such sign employ animation or
flashing lights and shall not project above the height of the
building more than 36 inches.
11-13-3:
AREA AND FRONTAGE REGULATIONS. None, except off-street parking,
loading, and unloading spaces, in accordance with Chapter 19, Title XI, of
these Revised Ordinances.
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„ri*ii« . ^ t - therein, the ahape and .!«; o^he lot « area upon^hich
.aid buildin, would h ^ f S * t J 2 . 7 S i S ! and oiroJtances aa the
K 2 S S T e ^ S » " S £ S c^dHppropriate ^relevant « , alio* a
greater height or greater number of stories in said building.
11-13-6:
COVERAGE REGULATIONS, No building or structure or group of
buildings, with their accessory buildings, shall cover more than 60 percent ol
the area of the lot.
11-13-7
FENCING, On lots containing mainbuildings other than single-family
dwellings fences may be required along the side and/or rear lot lines by the
Planning Commission. However, for topographical, architectural, structures or
other reasons, fencing may be waived in whole or in part* Where fences are
required by the Planning Commission, they shall be either the solid or open
mesh type with a minimum height of 4 feet and a maximum height of 6 feet.
Fences along the side lot lines shall extend from any required front yard
setback to the rear of the lot, but fences may be constructed along the side
lot lines in the front yard not to exceed 2 feet in height if the solid type or
4 feet if the open mesh type,
11-13-8:
BOND. A corporate surety or cash bond, or letter of credit from a
land title company licensed to do business in the State of Utah, or from a
bank, savings and loan association or other financially responsible lending
institution, in an amount equal to 2 percent of the construction costs of each
and every principal building constructed on the lot, other than a single-family
dwelling, shall be required to guarantee the completion of all site
development, including, among other things, the landscaping, sprinkling
systems, driveways, parking areas, sidewalks and curb and gutter; provided,
however, that the City Council, after recommendation by the Planning
Com*ission, may accept other security sufficient to guarantee such
installation.
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11-13-4

YARD REGULATIONS.
(A) Side Yards, For main buildings other than dwellings, none
except that wherever a building is built upon a lot adjacent to
a residential or agricultural zone boundary, there shall be
provided a side yard of not less than 10 feet on the side of
the J>uilding adjacent to the boundary line, and on corner lots
the side yard which faces on the street shall be not less than
30 feet. Accessory dwelling units where windows of such
dwelling are provided adjacent to any side lot line, such
dwellings shall be provided with a side yard of not less than
10 feet.
(B)

Front Yard. The minimum depth of the front yard for all
buildings shall be not less than 20 feet; provided, however,
that the Planning Commission, as a Conditional Use and after
consideration of the location of the proposed building, the
shape and size of the lot or area upon which said building
would be located, the uses being made of adjoining and nearby
properties and the building setback thereon, the landscaping
desired thereon, and such other conditions, elements and
circumstances as the Planning Commission shall consider
appropriate and relevant, may approve a lesser setback not to
exceed a variance of more than 50 percent from the setback
distance herein set forth. The Planning Commission may also
approve an awning, canopy, porch or other structure attached to
any such building in the front yard thereof extending to a
point, including roof overhang, not closer than one foot from
the street line, subject to the considerations herein mentioned
and to the further consideration that prior to approval, the
Planning Commission shall determine that the proposed awning,
canopy, porch or other attachment to such building shall not
unreasonably restrict visibility or sight clearance across the
major portion of the front yard required by this Section or as
otherwise modified by the Planning Commission in accordance
with the provisions and requirements hereof. All billboards
and other signs having less than 10 feet clearance between the
ground and sign shall be required to have the same front yard
as is required of buildings and other structures.

(C) Rear Yard.
feet*

The minimum rear yard for all buildings shall be 15

11-13-5
HEIGHT REGULATIONS. The maximum permitted height of buildings shall
not exceed two and one-half stories of 35 feet, provided that the Planning
Commission, as a Conditional Use and after consideration of the location of the
proposed building, the plans for incorporation of an approved fire protection
•Amended 11-13-4(8) - Ordinance #231

4/6/82
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CHAPTER 22
NON-CONFOHMING USE

11-22-1:

When Allowable

11-22-2:

Repairs and Structural Alterations

11-22-3:

Termination of a Non-Conforming Use

11-22-1:
WHEN ALLOWABLE. Any lawful use of buildings or land at the time of
the passage of this Ordinance, which does not conform to the regulations
prescribed in this Ordinance, shall be deemed a non-conforming use and such use
may be continued, but if such non-conforming use is discontinued for the period
of one year or more, except for residential structures or accessory farm
structures, any future use of said building or land must be in conformity with
the provisions of this Ordinance. A non-conforming use may be extended to more
floor area throughout a building provided no structural changes are made. A
non-conforming use, if changed to a conforming use, may not thereafter be
changed back to any non-conforming use.
11-22-2:
REPAIRS AND STRUCTURAL ALTERATIONS. Repairs and structural
alterations may be made to a non-conforming building provided that the floor
space of such building is not increased.
11-22-2:
TEHMINATION OF A NON-CONFOHMING USE. The right to operate and
maintain any non-conforming use or the right to maintain a sign or any
structure shall terminate whenever the structure or structures in which said
non-conforming use is operated and maintained and when any non-conforming sign:
(A)

Is damaged or destroyed from any cause whatsoever and the cost^
of repairing such damage or destruction exceeds 250 percent of
the assessed valuation of such structure or the date of such
damage or destruction or exceeds 50 percent of the replacement
cost of any such sign;

(B) Becomes obsolete or substandard or which has been allowed to
deteriorate to the extent that the cost of replacement or
renewing such structure or sign exceeds 250 percent of the
assessed valuation of such structure or exceeds 50 percent of
the replacement cost of such sign. (It shall be understood
that in determining such replacement costs of any structure or
sign there shall not be included therein the cost of land or
any factors other than the structure or sign itself);
(C)

Is required to be relocated for any reason whatsoever;
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(D)

When a building has been abandoned as evidence by the fact that
such building has not been used for a lawful use for a period
of two years.
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annexed to a municipality shall be zoned according to the zone of the annexing
municipality with which it has the longest common boundary.
Higtory: C. 1953,10-9-406, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, S 22.

10-9-407. Conditional uses.
(1) A zoning ordinance may contain provisions for conditional uses that may
be allowed, allowed with conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts,
based on compliance with standards and criteria set forth in the zoning
ordinance for those uses.
(2) The board of adjustments has jurisdiction to decide appeals of the
approval or denial of conditional use permits unless the legislative body has
enacted an ordinance designating the legislative body or another body as the
appellate body for those appeals.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-407, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 23; 1995, ch. 179, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

merit, effective May 1, 1995, inserted "the legislative body or" in Subsection (2).

10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures.
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure
may be continued.
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building,
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for
the purpose of the extension.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device
to a building is not a structural alteration.
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment
for:
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms
and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance;
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which
the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the
nonconforming use, if any; and
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by
acquiring the billboard and associated property rights through:
(i)gift;
(ii) purchase;
(iii) agreement;
(iv) exchange; or
(v) eminent domain.
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company from maintaining,
repairing, or restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God,
or vandalism, the municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by
eminent domain under Subsection (2)(c)(v).
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may remove
a billboard without providing compensation if, after providing the owner with
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reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the
legislative bodyfindsthat:
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading
statement in his application;
(b) the billboard is unsafe;
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or
(d) the billboard has been abandoned for at least 12 months.
(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of school
district property when the property ceases to be used for school district
purposes.
History: C. 1953,10-9-408, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 24; 1992, ch. 23, § 12; 1993,
ch. 286, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, inserted "establishment" in Subsection (2)(a) and added Subsection (4).
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993,
made a stylistic change in Subsection (lXc);

rewrote Subsection (2Xc); added Subsection (3),
redesignating the subsequent subsections accordingly; substituted "Subsections (2) and (3)"
for "Subsection (2)n and deleted "or amortization" after "compensation" in the introductory
language of Subsection (4); inserted "intentionally" in Subsection (4)(a); and added Subsection
(4)(d), making related stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Prior nonconforming use.
Zoning ordinance prohibiting excavation of
sand and gravel from a parcel of land was an
invalid exercise of the police power as enforced
against that particular parcel where the sand
and gravel had been excavated from the land
continuously from the time prior to the enact-

ment of the ordinance and where the ordinance
would cause severe loss to both the owner of the
land and the public as compared to the relatively small inconvenience to other owners in
the neighborhood caused by the excavation.
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 19
Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am, Jur. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and
Planning § 624 et seq.
C J J 3 . — 101A C. J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 154 et seq.
A.L.R. — Classification and maintenance of
advertising structures as nonconforming use,
80A.L.R.3d630.
Building in course of construction as establishing valid nonconforming use or vested right
to complete construction for intended use, 89
A.L.R.3d 1051.
Change in area or location of nonconforming
use as violation of zoning ordinance, 56
A.L.R.4th 769.
Addition of another activity to existing non-

conforming use as violation of zoning ordinance, 61 A.L.R.4th 724.
Change in volume, intensity, or means of
performing nonconforming use as violation of
zoning ordinance, 61 A.L.R.4th 806.
Change in type of activity of nonconforming
use as violation of zoning ordinance, 61
A.L.R.4th 902.
Alteration, extension, reconstruction, or repair of nonconforming structure or structure
devoted to nonconforming use as violation of
zoning ordinance, 63 A.L.R.4th 275.
Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses, 8 A.L.R.5th 391.

PART 5
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR ELDERLY
10-9-501. Residential facilities for elderly persons.
(1) (a) A residential facility for elderly persons may not operate as a
business.
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10-9-103

PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
10-9-101. Short titleAir Quality, Transportation, and LandUse Task Force. — Laws 1996, ch. 215, ereates the Air Quality, Transportation, and LandUse Task Force to study and recommend a
comprehensive policy and solutions to problems
and conflicts regarding the interrelationship of
air quality, transportation, and land-use issues,
and appropriates $35,000 for compensation and

expenses associated with the task force. The
task force is to report its findings and recommendations to the Health and Environment,
Transportation and Public Safety, and State
and Local Affairs Interim Committees before
December 31, 1996. Laws 1996, ch. 215 is
repealed effective December 31, 1996.

10-9-103. Definitions — Notice.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Billboard" means a freestanding ground sign located on industrial,
commercial, or residential property if the sign is designed or intended to
direct attention to a business, product, or service that is not sold, offered,
or existing on the property where the sign is located.
(b) "Chief executive officer" means:
(i) the mayor in municipalities operating under all forms of municipal government except the council-manager form; or
(ii) the city manager in municipalities operating under the councilmanager form of municipal government.
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of its unique
characteristics or potential impact on the municipality, surrounding
neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas or
may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that mitigate or
eliminate the detrimental impacts.
(d) "County" means the unincorporated area of the county.
(e) "Elderly person" means a person who is 60 years old or older, who
desires or needs to live with other elderly persons in a group setting, but
who is capable of living independently.
(f) (i) "General plan" means a document that a municipality adopts
that sets forth general guidelines for proposed future development of
the land within the municipality, as set forth in Sections 10-9-301 and
10-9-302.
(ii) "General plan" includes what is also commonly referred to as a
"master plan."
(g) "Legislative body" means the city council or city commission.
(h) "Lot line adjustment" in a subdivision means the relocation of the
property boundary line between two adjoining lots with the consent of the
owners of record,
(i) "Municipality" means a city or town,
(j) "Nonconforming structure" means a structure that:
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; and
(ii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with
the zoning regulation's setback, height restrictions, or other regulations that govern the structure,
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning
regulation governing the land changed; and
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(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with
the zoning regulations that now govern the land.
(1) "Official map" means a map of proposed streets that has the legal
effect of prohibiting development of the property until the municipality
develops the proposed street,
(m) (i) "Residential facility for elderly persons" means a single-family
or multiple-family dwelling unit that meets the requirements of Part
5 and any ordinance adopted under authority of that part.
(ii) "Residential facility for elderly persons" does not include a
health care facility as defined by Section 26-21-2.
(n) "Special district" means all entities established under the authority
of Title 17A, Special Districts, and any other governmental or quasigovernmental entity that is not a county, municipality, school district, or
unit of the state.
(o) "Street" means public rights-of-way, including highways, avenues,
boulevards, parkways, roads, lanes, walks, alleys, viaducts, subways,
tunnels, bridges, public easements, and other ways.
(p) (i) "Subdivision" means any land that is divided, resubdivided or
proposed to be divided into two or more lots, parcels, sites, units, plots,
or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future,
for offer, sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or
upon any and all othej plans, terms, and conditions,
(ii) "Subdivision" includes:
(A) the division or development of land whether by deed, metes
and bounds description, devise and testacy, lease, map, plat, or
other recorded instrument; and
(B) except as provided in Subsection (l)(p)(iii), divisions of land
for all residential and nonresidential uses, including land used or
to be used for commercial, agricultural, and industrial purposes.
(iii) "Subdivision" does not include:
(A) a bona fide division or partition of agricultural land for the
purpose of joining one of the resulting separate parcels to a
contiguous parcel of unsubdivided agricultural land, if neither
the resulting combined parcel nor the parcel remaining from the
division or partition violates an applicable zoning ordinance;
(B) a recorded agreement between owners of adjoining properties adjusting their mutual boundary if:
(I) no new lot is created; and
(II) the adjustment does not result in a violation of applicable zoning ordinances; or
(C) a recorded document, executed by the owner of record,
revising the legal description of more than one contiguous parcel
of property into one legal description encompassing all such
parcels of property.
(iv) The joining of a subdivided parcel of property to another parcel
of property that has not been subdivided does not constitute a
"subdivision" under this Subsection (l)(p) as to the unsubdivided
parcel of property or subject the unsubdivided parcel to the municipality's subdivision ordinance,
(q) "Unincorporated" means the area outside of the incorporated boundaries of cities and towns.
(2) (a) A municipality meets the requirements of reasonable notice required
by this chapter if it:
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Planning and Development — Race and Poverty —
Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev.
46.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§§ 10, 169 et seq.
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 226; 101A C J.S. Zoning and Land Planning
§§ 12 to 15, 65 et seq.

A.L.R. — Validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding
protest by neighboring property owners, 7
A.L.R.4th 732.
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«=» 601.1; Zoning «=» 15, 193 to 195, 359.

10-9-6. Board of adjustment — Appointment — Limitation
on exercise of powers as to restrictions on use of
property — Exemption from operation of ordinance.
In order to avail itself of the powers provided in this chapter the mayor,
with the advice and consent of the legislative body, shall appoint a board of
adjustment, and in the regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to authority under this chapter shall provide that the powers by this chapter given
shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner of any property of its use for
the purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted, and any ordinance enacted
under authority of this chapter shall exempt from the operation thereof any
building or structure as to which satisfactory proof shall be presented to the
board of adjustments provided for in this chapter that the present or proposed
situation of such building or structure is reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the public.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943,15-8-95; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch.
33, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-

ment substituted "chapter" for "article"
throughout the section; inserted "the mayor,
with the advice and consent of"; and made a
minor change in phraseology.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prior nonconforming use.
Rules and regulations.
Prior nonconforming use.
Excavation of sand and gravel was valid
nonconforming use and could not be enjoined
under zoning ordinance proscribing such use
since gravel operation had been conducted
prior to the enactment of the ordinance; nature
of extractive business contemplated continuance of use over entire parcel of land without
restriction to immediate area excavated at the
time the ordinance was passed; and nonconforming status was not lost because ownership

of land had changed since enactment of ordinance. Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake
City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967).
Rules and regulations.
The board may make such rules and regulations as are reasonably necessary or expedient
to enable it to carry out its administrative
functions and duties, but not the duties and
powers of the commission. Walton v. Tracy
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724
(1939).
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